PPT 公司治理 Shleifer & Vishny (1997,JF) PowerPoint Presentation ID3898448
The Limits to Arbitrage Shleifer and Vishny FINA 4329 StuDocu
A Survey of Corporate Governance. Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 31 May 1997 - Journal of Finance (Wiley-Blackwell) - Vol. 52, Iss: 2, pp 737-783. TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership.
PPT BhagatShleiferVishny (1990) PowerPoint Presentation, free download ID1159847
The Limits of Arbitrage. Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Published 1 July 1995. Economics. NBER Working Paper Series. In traditional models, arbitrage in a given security is performed by a large number of diversified investors taking small positions against its mispricing. In reality, however, arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small.
PPT 公司治理 Shleifer & Vishny (1997,JF) PowerPoint Presentation ID3898448
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) and Chevalier and Ellison (1995) consider the possibility that money managers "window dress" their portfolios to impress investors. In two interesting recent articles, Allen and Gorton (1993) and Dow and Gorton (1994) show how money managers can churn assets to mislead their investors, and how.
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Robert W. Vishny. Shleifer is from Harvard University. Vishny is from the University of Chicago. Prepared for the Nobel Symposium on Law and Finance, Stockholm, August 1995.. June 1997. Pages 737-783. References; Related; Information; Close Figure Viewer. Return to Figure. Previous Figure Next Figure. Caption. Download PDF.
A model of investor sentiment Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny Journal of Financial Economics,1998
Andrei Shleifer!,*, Robert Vishny#!Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. 1997, 1998). When investor rightssuch as the voting rights of the shareholders and the reorganization and liquidation rights of the creditors are extensive and well enforced by regulators or courts,
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Shleifer is from Harvard University and Vishny is from The University of Chicago. Nancy Zimmerman and Gabe Sunshine have helped us to understand arbitrage. We thank Yacine Aït Sahalia, Douglas Diamond, Oliver Hart, Steve Kaplan, Raghu Rajan, Jésus Saa-Requejo, Luigi Zingales, Jeff Zwiebel, and especially Matthew Ellman, Gustavo Nombela, René.
PPT BhagatShleiferVishny (1990) PowerPoint Presentation, free download ID1159847
Created Date: 20060227160045Z
(PDF) Anything is Possible On the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibria in the ShleiferVishny
See all articles by Andrei Shleifer Andrei Shleifer. Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). No. 2, 1997 Posted: 23 Jun 1998. Date Written: April 1996.. Suggested Citation. Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., A Survey of Corporate.
La Porta, R., F. LopezdeSilanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1997. “Legal Determinants of
ANDREI SHLEIFER, AND ROBERT W. VISHNY* Several recent studies, including those in Diego Gambetta (1988), as well as studies. 334 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1997 because interactions are too few to allow rep-utations to develop. One such large organization is the govern-ment, where bureaucrats must cooperate.
PPT 公司治理 Shleifer & Vishny (1997,JF) PowerPoint Presentation ID3898448
ROBERT W. VISHNY. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer are from Harvard University, and Vishny is from the University of Chicago. We are grateful to Alex Chang, Mark Chen, and Magdalena Lopez-Morton for research assistance, to Ed Glaeser, Stewart Myers, and Luigi Zingales for helpful comments, and to the HIID and the National Science Foundation for support of this research.
(PDF) The Limits of Arbitrage Shleifer and Vishny 1997 dirk dirkson Academia.edu
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. "The Limits of Arbitrage." Journal of Finance 52 (1): 35-55.
Shleifer and Vishny Summary Corruption Shleifer and Vishny Corruption outline The authors
A Survey of Corporate Governance. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny. Working Paper 5554. DOI 10.3386/w5554. Issue Date April 1996. This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
PPT BhagatShleiferVishny (1990) PowerPoint Presentation, free download ID1159847
Reprinted in Robert Cooter and Francesco Parisi, eds., Recent Developments in Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 2010. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W Vishny. 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance.". Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783.
; Conceptual Frame Work Source; Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Hsu... Download Scientific Diagram
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE . VOL. LII, NO. 2 . JUNE 1997 A Survey of Corporate Governance ANDREI SHLEIFER and ROBERT W. VISHNY* ABSTRACT This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corpo-rate governance systems around the world.
Limits of Arbitrage by Shleifer Vishny The Limits of Arbitrage Author(s) Andrei Shleifer and
A Survey of Corporate Governance. Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. Published 1 April 1996. Business, Law, Economics. Organizations & Markets eJournal. This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and LLSV (1996) focus on the legal solutions to agency problems between entrepreneurs and investors, and in particular emphasize the cross country differences in these solutions. Modigliani and Perotti (1996) also focus on contract enforcement as a determinant of external finance, and in particular stress the choice.
